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Summary  Wang  et  al.  proposed  a  new  hard  problem  on  lattices  which  is  an  extension  of
the small  integer  solution  (SIS)  on  lattices.  This  new  generated  hard  problem  is  named  to  be
bilateral in-homogeneous  small  integer  solution  (Bi-ISIS).  Using  the  hardness  of  Bi-ISIS,  Wang
et al.  proposed  a  new  key  exchange  protocol,  which  is  based  on  the  lattice-based  cryptography.
In this  paper,  we  signalize  that  Wang  et  al.’s  lattice-based  key  exchange  protocol  is  vulnerableKey  exchange
protocol;
Cryptanalysis
to an  attack,  namely,  man-in-the-middle  (MITM)  attack.  Through  this  attack,  Eavesdropper  can
intercept the  authenticated  messages  and  communicate  the  unauthentic  messages  among  the
communicating  parties.
© 2016  Published  by  Elsevier  GmbH.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license
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ey  exchange  protocols  provide  a  platform  to  negotiate  a
ey  among  a  group  of  parties.  It  is  mainly  used  in  the  pri-
ate  key  cryptography  to  exchange  a  common  key  between
wo  parties  which  is  used  as  a  secret  key  for  encryption
nd  decryption  of  a  secret  message.  In  cryptography,  key-
xchange  protocols  and  their  techniques  have  a  great  role
o  secure  the  network  communication  in  an  open  medium.
 lot  of  such  type  of  protocols  is  presented  in  the  literature
or  negotiating  a  secure  key  among  the  authenticated  users.
 This article belongs to the special issue on Engineering and Mate-
ial Sciences.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +91 9709202933.
E-mail address: dayasagar.ism@gmail.com (D.S. Gupta).
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ifﬁe  and  Hellman  (1976)  proposed  ﬁrst  key-exchange  proto-
ol,  which  is  used  to  generate  a  common  secret  key  between
wo  end  users  in  any  medium.  However,  several  such  types
f  protocols  are  proposed  to  securely  negotiate  a  common
ey  between  the  parties  (Hitchcock  et  al.,  2004;  Krawczyk,
996;  Tsudik  et  al.,  1996;  Gupta  and  Biswas,  2015a,  2015b,
tc.).  The  previous  mentioned  protocols  are  based  on  the
onventional  cryptographic  hard  problems  such  as  factor-
zation  problem,  DH  problem,  ID-based  problems,  etc.
In  the  year  2014,  Wang  et  al.  (2014)  ﬁrstly,  proposed  a
ey  exchange  scheme  which  has  no  longer  dependent  on
onventional  problems.  Their  proposed  key  exchange  pro-
ocol  is  based  on  a  modern  cryptographic  technique  named
attice-based  cryptography.  The  lattice-  based  cryptography
echniques  are  generally  used  in  modern  cryptography.  They
ontribute  a complex  security  in  comparison  to  the  conven-
ional  cryptographic  techniques.  Lattice  cryptography, as
icle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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the  name  suggests,  is  totally  based  on  the  concept  of  lat-
tices.  In  1996,  Ajtai  (1996)  found  that  there  are  some  hard
mathematical  problems  based  on  lattices.  These  hard  prob-
lems  based  on  the  lattice  were  small  integer  solution  (SIS)
and  shortest  vector  problem  (SVP).  These  problems  are  hard
to  solve  and  have  an  important  role  with  respect  to  cryp-
tography.  In  1997,  Goldreich  et  al.  (1997)  ﬁrstly  designed  a
lattice  based  encryption.  A  formal  deﬁnition  of  lattice  is  as
follows:  Let  x1,  .  .  ., xn ∈  Rm be  a  set  of  linearly  independent
vectors.  The  lattice    derived  by  the  independent  vectors
x1,..,  xn is  the  set  of  linear  combinations  of  x1,..,  xn with
coefﬁcients  in  integers,  i.e.
  =  {a1x1 +  a2x2 +  ·  ·  ·  +  anxn :  a1,  a2,  .  .  ., an ∈  Z}
A  basis  for    is  any  set  of  independent  vectors  that  gen-
erates  .
Road  map  of  paper
We  started  our  paper  with  the  section  ‘‘Introduction’’.  In
the  next  sections,  we  will  give  the  summary  of  Wang  et  al.’s
protocol  and  after  that  we  will  show  the  weakness  of  their
protocol.  Lastly,  we  will  conclude  our  paper.
Wang et al.’s lattice-based key exchange
protocol
In  this  section,  the  authors  of  this  paper  are  going  to  describe
Wang  et  al.’s  lattice-based  key  exchange  protocol.  To  do  so,
they  assume  some  parameters  which  are  to  be  used  in  the
protocol.  Let  n  be  an  integer  and  taken  as  a  security  param-
eter.  Now,  suppose  m,  q  and  ˇ  be  the  functions  of  n  where
q  be  a  large  prime  and  n    m.  Let  A  ∈  Zm×mq be  a  square
matrix  whose  rank  is  n.  The  main  purpose  of  taking  a  square
matrix  is  to  provide  a  double-sided  operation  on  matrices.
The  steps  of  Wang  et  al.’s  lattice-based  key  exchange  pro-
tocol  is  given  here,  which  exchanges  a  common  secret  key
between  two  end  users,  say,  Alice  and  Bob:
Step  1:  Alice  and  Bob,  both  agree  upon  two  public  param-
eters  A  ∈  Zm×mq and  a  real  number  ˇ
Step  2:  Alice  chooses  a  random  vector  x  ∈  Zm, where
‖x‖ <  ˇ  and  calculates  public  message  u  =  Ax  (mod
q)  and  sends  this  generated  message  u  to  the  Bob A
Figure  1  Block  diagram  of  the  proposed  Wol  229
tep  3:  Similarly,  Bob  chooses  another  random  vector  y  ∈
Zm,  where  y  <  ˇ  and  calculates  a public  message
vt =  ytA  (mod  q).  This  calculated  message  v  is  sent
to  Alice  by  Bob
tep  4:  After  receiving  a  public  message  from  each  other,
Alice  calculates  the  secret  key  K  =  vtx  =  ytAx  and
similarly,  Bob  calculates  the  same  secret  key  as  K  =
ytu  =  ytAx
Finally,  the  shared  secret  key  exchange  between  Alice
nd  Bob  is  K  =  ytAx  (mod  q).
The  brief  idea  of  Wang  et  al.’s  protocol  is  shown  in  the
ig.  1:
an-in-the-middle attack on Wang et al.’s
rotocol
n  this  section,  weakness  of  lattice-based  key  exchange  pro-
ocol  proposed  by  Wang  et  al.  is  presented.  Their  proposed
ey  exchange  protocol  is  insecure  against  man-in-the-middle
MITM)  attack.  Unauthentic  messages  might  be  transferred
o  the  authentic  participants  during  negotiation  of  the
ecret  key  since  the  protocol  suffers  from  MIMT  attack.  To
how  MIMT  attack  in  Wang  et  al.’s  protocol,  let  us  sup-
ose  an  adversary  named,  Eve.  Eve  works  as  a legitimate
ser  for  both  Alice  and  Bob.  A  key  is  exchanged  between
lice  and  Eve  masquerading  Bob  and  similarly  another  key
s  exchanged  between  Bob  and  Eve  masquerading  Alice.  The
IMT  attack  is  brieﬂy  described  as  follows:  Eve,  the  adver-
ary,  intercepts  both  messages  u  and  v  sent  by  Alice  and  Bob
o  each  other  respectively,  and  computes  two  forge  message
 =  Az  (mod  q)  and  wt1 =  ztA  (mod  q)  where  z  ∈  Zm is  a
andom  vector  and  z  <  ˇ.  Eve  generates  two  secret  keys;
ne  for  Alice  and  another  for  Bob  as  follows  (Fig.  2):
.  After  intercepting  u  and  v,  Eve  generates  keys  K1 =
ztu  =  ztAx  for  Alice  and  K2 =  vtz  =  ytAz  for  Bob  as
z  ∈  Zm is  chosen  by  Eve  itself  and  sends  forge  message
w  to  Bob  and  w1 to  Alice,  respectively.
.  After  receiving  w1,  Alice  generates  a  secret  key  K1 =
wt1x  =  ztAx.
.  Similarly,  after  receiving  w,  Bob  generates  a  secret  key
K2 =  ytw  =  ytAz.
The  key  K1 is  a  common  key  for  Alice  and  Eve,  however,
lice  thinks  that  the  key  K1 is  negotiated  with  Bob.  Similarly,
ang  et  al.’s  key  exchange  technique.
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on Computer and Communications Security.Figure  2  Demonstration  of  MIMT  atta
2 is  a  key  actually  negotiated  between  Bob  and  Eve,  not
etween  Alice  and  Bob.
onclusion
n  this  proposed  paper,  the  security  in-resistance  of  Wang
t  al.’s  lattice-based  key  exchange  protocol  is  shown.
 person-in-the-middle  may  easily  masquerade  both  the
uthentic  end  users  and  may  delete,  modify  or  intercept
he  communicated  messages  between  end  users.
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